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In a recent article in this journal Profes-
sor William L. Blizek argued that there is 
a distinction between a social and a causal 
concept of “responsibility,” and that un-
derstanding this can help us understand 
the concepts of legal, societal, and moral 
responsibility.1
He says that in cases like “X was respon-
sible for the automobile accident,” the con-
cept of responsibility is causal, not social. 
He also mentions the example, “Faulty wir-
ing was responsible for the fire,” an example 
that makes it clear that sometimes “respon-
sibility” has an entirely causal meaning, 
“and may be equivalent to ‘causality.’”2
But he adds: “Other uses of ‘responsibil-
ity,’ however, suggest a concept which is 
incompatible with the causal concept—a 
social concept of responsibility.’”3 He gives 
as an example “X is responsible for the dec-
orations at the forthcoming gala ball.” This 
statement, he says, cannot be translated 
into a causal statement without changing 
its meaning. He points out that one may 
choose to accept or not accept responsi-
bility for the decorations, but one cannot 
choose to accept or not accept responsibil-
ity for an accident in the same way. Fur-
ther, we may, in taking on a responsibility 
sometimes “engage ourselves to take on a 
vast, and antecedently unspecifiable range 
of specific responsibilities,”4 and this fact 
seems to show that the meaning of respon-
sibility here is different from simple causal 
responsibility. He also points out that the 
social concept of responsibility allows for 
imputation of responsibility for possible 
rather than actual consequence—as, for ex-
ample, when we impute the possible con-
sequences of an unsuccessful assassination 
attempt, or a careless and dangerous but, 
in tenns of actual consequences, harmless 
firing of one’s rifle. In contrast, when the 
intended consequences are good (e.g., hav-
ing a well-decorated gala ball), imputation 
is for the actual bad consequences (as when 
the decorations are badly done).
The causal and the social concepts of re-
sponsibility share the notions of (a) a causal 
agent, and (b) some effect for which the 
agent is a cause. But Professor Blizek argues 
that the social concept has an additional ele-
ment not shared by the causal concept: that 
of an adjudicator, someone who imputes 
responsibility.5 Thus he writes, “social re-
sponsibility is not a relationship between 
cause and effect, but a relationship between 
an agent and some consequence, as pre-
scribed by an adjudicator.”6 He points out 
that our judgments of the different kind of 
social responsibility may change, as the so-
ciety changes; redefinition of social respon-
sibilities by a society is thus both a reflec-
tion of social change and a mechanism by 
which it may take place. 
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There is little to dispute in Professor 
Blizek’s account of the role of the adjudica-
tor in affixing the social concept of respon-
sibility. But the claim that there is a differ-
ent concept of causal responsibility which 
does not involve any “adjudicator” is one 
that Professor Blizek has not justified. In 
the remainder of this essay I wish to show 
that the causal concept of responsibility 
requires an “adjudicator” as much as does 
the social concept, and that the social con-
cept of responsibility can be analyzed into 
causal terms for the examples that Profes-
sor Blizek mentions. I shall not be attempt-
ing to show that his account of the social 
concept of responsibility is incorrect; I shall 
only show that he has not supported his 
claim that there are two distinct concep-
tions of responsibility, one causal and the 
other social. 
Consider “X was responsible for the au-
tomobile accident.” We may flesh out this 
example by supposing that X went through 
a red light one foggy morning thereby 
crashing into Y. Was X then the cause of 
the accident? We may suppose that if X 
hadn’t gone through the red light, the ac-
cident would not have occurred. But if Y 
had not gone through the green light, the 
accident also would not have occurred. Or 
if Y’s light had also been red, or perhaps if 
it had not been foggy, or if X had not had 
an appointment, or if a policeman had been 
directing traffic, or if V’s car had failed to 
start that morning, the accident would not 
have occurred. Thus the accident can be 
said to have been caused by X, Y, Y’s green 
light, X’s appointment, the fog, the fact that 
V’s car started, and the absence of a police-
man. How do we decide, from among the 
items on this list, which we will finally, call 
“the cause”? An adjudicator of some kind 
determines which of the causes it is most 
useful, or interesting, or enlightening to call 
“the cause.” 
This same account works for “Faulty wir-
ing was responsible for (or was the cause of
7 See note 4. 
cause of) the fire.” We may suppose that if 
it had not been for the presence of faulty 
wiring a fire would not have occurred. But 
the fire also would not have occurred but 
for the presence of combustible material, 
oxygen in the atmosphere, electric current 
passing through the wires, the absence of 
an afternoon shower, the absence of a fire-
man within five feet of the wiring when it 
heated up, and the earlier inability of the 
owner to pay for rewiring. It is not very 
interesting or enlightening or useful to say 
that the fire was caused by the presence of 
oxygen in the air, or the absence of a fire-
man, or the poverty of the owner. But such 
statements may be nonetheless true; and it 
is again an “adjudicator” who determines 
that faulty wiring was “the cause” of the fire.
Now let us consider “X is responsible for 
the decorations at the forthcoming gala 
ball.” I think this may be read as “X has 
promised that he will be the cause of good 
or adequate decorations for that ball,” if 
X took on the responsibility by making a 
promise. The reason one can choose to take 
on this responsibility in a way that one can-
not choose with respect to one’s responsi-
bility for an auto accident, is that one can 
choose to be or not be the cause of future, 
possible states of affairs, whereas one can-
not choose to be or not be the cause of ei-
ther an accident or a past event. When one 
promises to be the cause of something, 
he is often engaging himself “to take on a 
vast, and antecedently unspecifiable range 
ofspecific responsibilities.”7 For when one 
promises to complete a task, one promises 
to be the causally sufficient condition of its 
completion, and the causally sufficient con-
ditions of events are usually “vast and un-
specifiable.” Thus the presence of vast and 
unspecifiable ranges of responsibilities does 
not point toward any non-causal concep-
tion of responsibility, but only toward the 
concept of causally sufficient conditions. 
The fact that X has promised to be the cause 
of good or adequate decorations means he 
is responsible if the decorations are bad, 
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since he has then failed to keep his promise. 
Cases where one is in some sense respon-
sible for merely possible consequences can 
be analyzed in terms of contrary-to-fact 
conditionals. For our examples we get: 
If the assassin had succeeded, his action 
would have caused the death of a Presi-
dent.
If someone had been in the path of the 
bullet, X’s firing would have caused his 
injury or death.
But these are like:
If the wolf had succeeded, his action 
would have caused the death of the elk.
If someone had been in the tornado’s path, 
he would have been injured or killed.
We make judgments about possible or in-
tended consequences, regardless of whether 
there is any “social concept of responsibil-
ity” involved in the judgment or not. This is 
because we can learn from such judgments 
about how to avoid certain kinds of bad 
consequences. So the reference to possible 
consequences is not a mark of a social as 
opposed to a causal concept of responsibil-
ity; it is simply a mark of our general inter-
est in avoiding certain kinds of bad causal 
consequences. 
Professor Blizek’s paper correctly points 
out the role of the “adjudicator” in mak-
ing judgments of responsibility. But I have 
argued that the adjudicator’s role extends 
to certain kinds of purely causal assign-
ments of responsibility, especially those 
which seek to discover “the cause” of an 
occurrence. Some philosophers think that 
the “causal concept of responsibility” is the 
concept of a kind of responsibility that is 
“objective” and non-relative, while the so-
cial concept of responsibility is adjudicator-
dependent’ perhaps in some way arbitrary, 
and relative to human interests and pur-
poses. In fact, the social and causal concepts 
of responsibilityare equally adjudicator-de-
pendent, equally “objective,” and equally 
relative to human interests and purposes.
